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Abstract—There is a significant lack of software fire-1
walls for 5G networks especially when the support2
for the Internet of Things (IoT) technologies such as3
NB-IoT are considered. The main contribution of this4
research work is an advanced software firewall based on5
the Open Virtual Switch (OVS), which is able to provide6
firewall capabilities over these 5G IoT devices. The7
proposed software firewall is able to significantly scale8
up the number of rules to fulfill the 5G Key Performance9
Indicator of controlling 1 million IoT devices per square10
kilometer. Intensive experimental results are achieved11
in this work, validating the suitability of the proposed12
architecture for this remarkable level of scalability. In13
the most demanding conditions, where more than 114
million of firewall rules are installed and 1 million NB-15
IoT devices are sending traffic, yielding a total of 416
Gbps, the system shows only 8% of packet loss and 417
ms delay.18
Index Terms—5G, NB-IoT, OpenVSwicth, Software19
Datapath, firewall20
I. Introduction21
The maximum 5G speed in the New Radio (NR)22
interface reported by Huawei in October 2019 [1] is23
3.67 Gbps, beating their previous world-wide mark of24
2 Gbps. A more typical scenario using the same tech-25
nology indicates 1 Gbps for the coverage of 1 square26
kilometer. In that coverage, a 5G NB-IoT (NarrowBand-27
Internet of Things) network is expected to provide28
access to 1,000,000 devices according to the 5G Key29
Performance Indicator (KPI) defined by 5G Public-30
Private Partnership (PPP). When combined with soft-31
warization and virtualization, which are the corner-32
stone technologies in 5G architectures to reduce cap-33
ital expenditure (CAPEX) and operational expenditure34
(OPEX) , it imposes a significant scalability challenge35
and performance overhead that need to be addressed36
to fulfill the ambitious 5G KPI.37
This work was funded in part by the European Commission Horizon
2020 5G-PPP Programme under Grant Agreement Number H2020-
ICT-2016-2/761913 (SliceNet: End-to-End Cognitive Network Slic-
ing and Slice Management Framework in Virtualised Multi-Domain,
Multi-Tenant 5G Networks). This work has been also supported by
the UWS VP Fund - 5G Video Lab.
Currently, software firewalls are primarily designed 38
to protect traditional IP networks. The support to pro- 39
tect overlay IP networks used by 5G NB-IoT archi- 40
tectures has not been sufficiently provided. Moreover, 41
to the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is no 42
published software-based firewall solution that is able 43
to deal with the level of scalability envisioned for the 44
massive number of IoT devices. These gaps pose sig- 45
nificant security challenges that need to be addressed. 46
This paper attempts to address these problems by 47
providing a novel software firewall capability with sup- 48
port for 5G NB-IoT overlay networks. The software 49
firewall exposes a significant increase in the scala- 50
bility with respect to the number of rules, up to 5G 51
expectations. The following list enumerates the main 52
contributions of this work: 53
• Novel 5G software firewall architecture with ad- 54
vanced capabilities for 5G-enabled IoT networks. 55
• Significant enhancement of the scalability in terms 56
of handling a large number of firewall rules for 57
security proposes, being able to handle up to 1 58
million firewall rules per software firewall. 59
• Empirical validation of the scalability and perfor- 60
mance of the proposed solution based on a proto- 61
typical implementation in a realistic testbed. 62
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Sec- 63
tion II outlines a state of the art on software firewall 64
capabilities and firewall filtering in overlay networks. 65
Section III describes the design and prototyping of the 66
proposed scalable 5G IoT firewall architecture. Section 67
IV presents the implementation of the proposed archi- 68
tecture. Section V validates the solution and provides 69
a scalability analysis of the prototype. Finally, Section 70
VI provides conclusions and future work. 71
II. Related Work 72
The vast majority of open source and commercial 73
software switches that could be extended to act as 74
firewalls simply have not been designed to support 75
overlay networks, and they merely work in traditional 76
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Fig. 1. Architectural of the proposed software firewall
IP networks. For example, Linux iptables, ebtables,77
ipcop, pfSense, ipFire, ufw, smoothwall and VyOS fire-78
walls do not support any overlay network, including79
the GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP) used to implement80
5G NB-IoT networks. Windows Firewall, Avast, AVS,81
TinyWall, GlassFire and many others also lack the same82
capability for the Windows operating system.83
There is significant absence of solutions to address84
the lack of support of firewall policies over the GTP pro-85
tocol, used in LTE, LTE-Advanced (LTE-A) and 5G and86
on their respective adaptions for cellular IoT networks,87
LTE-M and NB-IoT. In the hardware side, Ricart et al.88
[2] provided a hardware appliance with these novel89
capabilities able to work up to 3.67 Gbps and up to90
1024 wildcard-enabled firewall rules against 512 flows91
(305 kilo packet per second - kPPS). In the software92
side, Salva et al. [3] indicated that the maximum rules93
support for Linux IP tables, with an extended version94
to support GTP traffic, in the most ideal conditions,95
are 512 rules when traffic is transferred at 1 Gbps96
against 512 flows (666 kPPS). Salva et al. [4], further97
investigated the support for NB-IoT traffic using IP98
tables-BPF integration, optimized for scalability on the99
number of rules, achieving a maximum of 4096 rules100
for 4096 simultaneous flows at 90 Mbps (60 kPPS).101
At higher speeds, packets drops and delay start to102
be unacceptable. Such level of scalability will work103
for normal cellular network end users although it is104
not able to deal with the significantly higher level of105
scalability envisioned for 5G IoT. In early 2019, Forti-106
Gate, a software appliance from Forninet [5], claimed107
to provide a carrier-grade firewall support for LTE, 108
LTE-A, 5G and IoT. However, these capabilities are 109
not reflected yet in their data sheets, no performance 110
has been published and for their highest-end product 111
(VM08), they claimed to provide support for up to 4 112
Gbps with a maximum of 40k firewall rules. Even that 113
level of scalability in software appliances will not be 114
suitable for 5G requirements. Another way to address 115
this scalability is to perform the deployment of several 116
virtual appliances in the same physical machine in 117
order to use a distributed load-balancing approach to 118
deal with scalability. 119
The lack of support for such advanced firewall capa- 120
bilities in software solutions and the need to push the 121
scalability boundaries to truly support for 5G networks 122
has been the main motivation of this work. 123
III. The Proposed Architecture 124
Fig. 1 provides an overview of the proposed highly- 125
scalable 5G NB-IoT software firewall architecture. It 126
has been logically divided in three different planes. The 127
kernel space module works at the maximum speed with 128
hardware administrative privileges (execution ring 1). 129
When a packet is received by the network inter- 130
face card (NIC) driver, it is inserted into the match- 131
action pipeline implemented in this kernel module. The 132
match-action pipeline applies the firewall rules to the 133
packets being received in the data path. To do so, 134
the packets are parsed using the extracted metadata. 135
An extension to the traditional IP packet parsing has 136
been designed and prototyped to be able to extract 137
information about the GTP protocol and also about the 138
inner IP headers that are inside the tunneling protocol 139
to be able to provide firewall capabilities not only to 140
traditional IP traffic but also to 5G NB-IoT traffic. This 141
parsing extension is explained later in subsection 2. 142
The metadata extracted is matched against a firewall 143
rule table where all the firewall rules are inserted for 144
a lookup in the table. It is noted that the traditional 145
design of a table of rules only considers fields of the 146
traditional IP network. The proposed system extended 147
the rule table with the new fields related to the GTP 148
protocol in order to include the new expressions of 149
the firewall rules for 5G NB-IoT. If there is a match 150
in the rule table, then the action is taken. Different 151
default policies are supported with deny or accept by 152
default which is seen as the last implicit action to be 153
applied if there is not any match against the rules. 154
The key for speed is the design in the kernel space. 155
Meanwhile, there is a noticeable trend to bypass the 156
kernel and implement everything in the user space. 157
Our approach is to make use of the kernel which 158
is a much more optimized way when compared with 159
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Fig. 2. Extended parser with 5G NB-IoT support
the traditional kernel modules, and thus a new kernel160
module is proposed. To help achieve scalability, we161
have taken a co-design approach between kernel and162
user spaces, and thus further introduced another new163
module implemented in the user space. This module164
keeps all the rules inserted into the firewall by the165
user in memory. The module employs OpenFlow and166
the architecture of tables defined in OpenFlow for this167
purpose. When the packets being processed in the168
kernel do not match any of the installed rules in the169
table of the kernel, a communication between kernel170
and user spaces takes place to perform a lookup in the171
user-space tables. If there is a match, the firewall rule172
in the user space is installed in the kernel module for173
performance purposes. This communication between174
user space and kernel module has been also extended175
in order to inter-exchange all the new metadata re-176
quired to be copied between user and kernel spaces.177
Then, another key decision for scalability has been the178
fact that when rules are installed in the kernel, if they179
have not been looked up for a period of time, they are180
removed from the table, freeing up resources and thus181
enhancing scalability. When new packets come, the182
rules will be reinstalled into the kernel by means of the183
user space to kernel migration of rules mechanisms.184
This architectural philosophy is not radically new, and185
the Open Virtual Switch (OVS) [6] software switch,186
used for multiple purposes in softwarized networks,187
adopts a similar architecture. However, OVS does not188
provide firewall capabilities for 5G NB-IoT, which is189
addressed in this work. Our prototypes are a significant190
extension of the original OVS software to deal with an191
enhanced level of scalability.192
A. NB-IoT Parsing Extension193
Fig. 2 shows the proposed extension over the tradi-194
tional parsing of IP packets. When a network packet195
arrived at the parser, it visits different metadata ex-196
tractors. For example, in the MAC processing, the 197
source and destination MAC addresses and the Eth- 198
ernet type field are extracted in order to allow later on 199
creating firewall rules based on the metadata. Analo- 200
gously, source and destination IP addresses and key 201
attributes available in the IP header are extracted, 202
including transport protocol, Differentiated Services 203
Control Protocol (DSCP) field, time-to-live (TTL) field, 204
among others. In UDP and TCP, the source and desti- 205
nation ports are extracted. For TCP, all the TCP flags 206
are also extracted to allow key security firewall rules to 207
be applied and to deal with the tracking of the connec- 208
tion to support both stateful and stateless operational 209
modes on the firewall. Then, when the GTP protocol is 210
detected, the Tunnel Endpoint Identification (TEID) is 211
extracted. This field is used to uniquely identify a 5G 212
NB-IoT device across all the antennas of the network. 213
This tunneling protocol has the IP packets generated 214
by the NB-IoT devices (inner traffic) whereas the outer 215
traffic is the 5G infrastructure traffic required to deal 216
with NB-IoT connectivity, control and mobility (if sup- 217
ported). Thus, the inner traffic need to be parsed again. 218
To do so, it takes a re-entrance on the previously 219
visited parsing steps. It will allow extracting now the 220
information related to the NB-IoT devices including, 221
specifically, the source and destination IP addresses, 222
ports and other key firewall information. This extension 223
in the parsing provides the number capabilities to deal 224
with NB-IoT firewall rules, which is one of the main 225
motivations of this paper. 226
The following excerpt of code is an example of a 227
firewall rule supported now thanks to our extension 228
(rule in JSON format). A flow from inner source port 229
16500 of a given NB-IoT device with source IP address 230
10.10.10.1 going to outer destination port 2152 is 231
identified in the 5G network with the TEID 2001 using 232
GTP as the tunneling protocol, and it will be dropped 233
once mapped:234
235
236
{"rule": {237
"firewall": "fw0",238
"action": "add-rule",239
"table" : 0,240
"cookie": "0x100",241
"priority": "0xFF",242
"match": [243
{"outer_destination_port": 2152 },244
{"tunnel_protocol": "GTP" }245
{"tunnel_key": 2001 },246
{"inner_source_ip": "10.10.10.1" },247
{"inner_source_port": 16500 }248
],249
"action": "drop"250
}251
}252
253
As it can been observed, each firewall rule has a field254
termed "cookie" which purpose is to uniquely identify255
a rule. Besides, Each rule is inserted into a table and256
a priority is set for it.257
IV. Implementation258
The proposed architecture has been implemented as259
extensions in OVS (version 2.9.2) using the C language260
in both user and kernel spaces. More details of the261
original OVS can be found in [7]. To be concrete, the262
first extension has been carried out over the kernel263
module of OVS (openvswitch.ko) to support parsing of264
5G NB-IoT protocol and new fields in the expressions265
of firewall rules. The second extension has been ap-266
plied on the Netlink communication between the open-267
vswitch.ko module and the OVS user-space software268
daemon (vswitchd). The command line tools have also269
been extended, including both ovs-dpctl and ovs-ofctl270
in order to allow the administrator to insert the rules in271
both OpenFlow tables and kernel tables directly on de-272
mand. These prototypical extensions were introduced273
following exactly the design presented in Section III,274
and the results achieved in this prototype are described275
in Section V.276
V. Experiment Results277
This section validates the suitability of the proposed278
NB-IoT firewall and analyses the scalability achieved279
in the number of rules and the performance achieved280
in terms of delay, jitter, packet loss and throughput.281
A. Testbed Description282
Experiments have been conducted on a host com-283
puter testbed for the proposed OVS-based 5G NB-IoT284
software firewall, with the following specification: Dell285
T5810 with 1xIntel Xeon E5-2630 v4 CPU (10 cores 286
with hyper-threading), 32GB RAM, and 512GB SSD 287
HDD. Fig. 3 depicts the setup of the testbed deployed 288
to empirically validate the proposed firewall. Experi- 289
ments are handled by the experiment controller script 290
that customizes the configuration of each experiment 291
with different parameters that allow analyzing the 292
behaviour of the firewall in different scenarios. These 293
parameters and their range of values are explained in 294
Subsection V-B. 295
For each experiment, the experiment controller 296
script injected the rules into the NB-IoT 5G firewall 297
through a dedicated management interface (See 1 in 298
Fig. 3). After that, the traffic generator agent gener- 299
ated several pcap files that were sent in parallel by 300
the traffic sender agent (See 2 and 3 in Fig. 3). The 301
pcap files generated are compliant with the NB-IoT 302
protocol. The number of flows generated by each NB- 303
IoT device was fixed to 1 flow, and the number of NB- 304
IoT devices sending traffic was always matched with 305
the number of rules. Thus, a rule always produced a 306
match to a given flow leading to dropping or passing. 307
This is a way to ensure that the experiments were fair 308
and there was not any kind of artificial acceleration 309
due to the synthetic generation of the pcaps. In fact, 310
each NB-IoT device available in the pcap had different 311
source and destination IP address, different source and 312
destination ports, and even different GTP tunnel ID. 313
This traffic represented the pattern and behaviour of a 314
5G node allocated at the edge of the network, where all 315
these NB-IoT devices were connected to the radio in- 316
terface managed by the edge node. The traffic was then 317
received by the 5G NB-IoT firewall, which processed 318
it through the NB-IoT 5G Match-Action pipeline. The 319
outgoing traffic was sent back to the virtual machine 320
where it was captured by the traffic receiver agent 321
and saved in a pcap file. In a final step, the results 322
analyzer agent compared both sent and received pcap 323
files to gather the experiment results (delay, jitter, 324
packet loss and throughput). In the experiments, the 325
receiver received the whole traffic originally sent since 326
there is an "drop-by-default" firewall policy and each 327
flow has a "pass/accept" action associated. 328
B. Experiments 329
Table I lists the range of values of the different 330
parameters that configured each of the experiments 331
conducted to validate and evaluate the proposed 5G 332
NB-IoT software firewall. As shown in the table, NB- 333
IoT traffic consisting of 1500 byte MTU was transmit- 334
ted by every IoT device. Scalability was analyzed in 335
two different dimensions: the number of IoT devices 336
sending traffic and amount of traffic sent by each of 337
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software firewall
these devices. As mentioned, the number of NB-IoT338
devices matched the number of rules inserted in the339
firewall. The traffic sent by each of the IoT devices340
was classified and processed in an isolated way with341
respect to the rest of the traffic and each of the rules342
was tailored for that purpose. Through this scheme,343
an ultra-fine grained firewall control mechanism was344
provided for the NB-IoT traffic in a 5G architecture.345
For simplicity, for each different configuration executed346
in the testbed, all IoT devices transmitted traffic with347
the same bandwidth. This bandwidth was the result of348
dividing the total available bandwidth by the number349
of connected IoT devices.350
With Regard to the methodology applied, each exper-351
iment was executed 10 times. To avoid outlier values,352
the best and worst results were ignored and the final353
outcomes shown in this paper are the arithmetic mean354
TABLE I
Range of values for each parameter analyzed in the experiments
Parameter Range of Values
Packet size (MTU) 1500 Bytes
Bandwidth (Mbps) 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000
Number of Devices/Rules 1, 2, 4, 8, 16 ... 1048576 ( 2n,n in [0,1,..,20] )
Type of Traffic NB-IoT Traffic (GTP)
Type of Rule Matching inner source ip address and inner destination port
of the remaining 8 experiments. 355
C. Results 356
Fig. 4. Scalability analysis of packet loss
Fig. 4 shows the evolution of packets loss when 357
ranging exponentially both the number of firewall rules 358
and devices in 1:1 ratio and also when ranging linearly 359
the total bandwidth for transmission per corresponding 360
number of devices. It is worth mentioning that 1 Gbps 361
there was no packet loss when 1 million of flows and 362
rules were installed in the firewall. For the case of 363
4 Gbps, speeds currently aligned with the maximum 364
performance achieved in the new radio interface up 365
to date, there was no packet loss either up to 32k 366
rules. Beyond these boundaries of system stability, 367
packet loss started to appear and in the most stress- 368
ful condition, at 4 Gbps, with 1 million rules and 1 369
million devices, a very reasonable 8.2% packet loss 370
ratio was achieved. These numbers are remarkably 371
advantageous especially considering highly demanding 372
nature of the IoT communications. It is noted that in 373
all the scenarios tested, the transmission throughput 374
was exactly the same as the reception throughput with 375
the variations associated to the percentage of packet 376
loss. Thus it has been decided not to include this graph 377
although these facts are critical to understand that all 378
the graphs presented next are accurate. 379
Fig. 5. Scalability analysis of delay
Fig. 5 shows the evolution of the delay incurred by380
the software firewall when ranging the same parame-381
ters. The behaviour of the graph is similar to that of382
packet loss. The system was stable despite the delay383
added by the number of rules up to 32k rules. After384
this threshold, the system behaved very decently at385
1 and 2 Gbps. When the throughput were scaled to386
3 and 4 Gbps, the delay was increased exponentially.387
It is very relevant to indicate that at 1 Gbps, the388
delay inserted when there was 1 million rules was389
around 0.1 ms and at 4 Gbps, the delay added was390
around 4 ms. These numbers are far beyond better391
than the acceptance boundaries defined for 5G NB-IoT392
traditionally associated to delay-tolerant applications.393
These results show that the firewall will be suitable394
even for delay-sensitive 5G NB-IoT use cases.395
Fig. 6. Scalability analysis of jitter
Regarding the analysis of jitter (i.e., variance in396
packet delays), Fig. 6 shows a very similar trend with397
respect to the delay graph presented in Fig. 5. The 398
stable boundaries were similar and then an exponential 399
increase appeared following a similar pattern. This 400
time, in the most stressed scenario (at 4 Gbps, 1 401
millions flows and 1 million rules), the jitter was about 402
3.5 ms. When combined with the delay, the worst case 403
maximum delay would be lower than 8 ms. 404
These results have validated the suitability of the 405
proposed architecture for the scalability and perfor- 406
mance envisioned in 5G networks. 407
VI. Conclusion 408
This paper proposes a highly scalable software fire- 409
wall architecture that provides support for NB-IoT de- 410
vices in 5G networks and beyond. The architecture has 411
been validated with the extreme use case of massive 412
machine-type communications composed by traffic of 413
1 million devices, totalling 4 Gbps, with 1 million of 414
firewall rules installed. Experiment results have shown 415
that the solution has very promising performance of 416
around 8% of packet losses and just 4 ms delay under 417
these extreme conditions where all these devices are 418
connected to the same radio interface and the software 419
firewall is deployed in the edges of the network. The 420
level of scalability is compliant with the 5G KPI expec- 421
tation. 422
In future work, this level of high scalability will be 423
explored in the context of network slicing and network 424
slice management where different types of actions 425
need to be applied over the same type of traffic. In 426
addition, the compatibility to other IoT protocols will 427
also be investigated. 428
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